Project charter
Mission
Give an authenticated subject a typed, policy-governed capability for one explicit resource and environment. Keep credentials behind the provider boundary and return structured evidence of the decision and verified outcome.
Authentication never grants a capability. Missing, invalid, uncertain, stale, or unavailable authorization information resolves to deny.
Scope
Foundation proves four bounded behaviors:
- discover an allowed capability;
- inspect a configured local node through
node.inspect; - deny an unauthorized resource before provider invocation;
- correlate request, decision, result, verification, and redacted evidence.
Yukh MCP is not a shell broker, credential vault, orchestrator, project tracker, coordination relay, or conversational approval mechanism.
Operating rules
- Clients select only published, versioned capabilities.
- The server binds subject, action, resource, environment, and current policy.
- Providers receive bounded authority; clients never receive credentials.
- Mutations require an inspectable plan and any plan-bound approval.
- Verification checks declared postconditions independently from execution.
- Evidence is structured and redacted; raw prompts and secrets are excluded.
Design gate
Every public capability or boundary change must pass these questions:
| Requirement | Acceptance question |
|---|---|
| Capability, not custody | Does the operation avoid credentials and unrestricted command text? |
| Deny by default | Does uncertainty stop before provider invocation? |
| Typed and bounded | Are input, output, scope, time, retries, and failures explicit? |
| Plan before mutation | Are effects and preconditions inspectable before apply? |
| Specific approval | Is approval bound to the exact plan, identity, target, and policy? |
| Verification | Are postconditions distinct from execution success? |
| Safe failure | Are partial effects, retry, rollback, and stop conditions explicit? |
| Redacted evidence | Can an investigation proceed without prompts or secrets? |
| Vendor neutrality | Does the public contract avoid provider-specific authority? |
| Reviewable evolution | Do trust-boundary changes have an RFC and threat review? |
An unproven answer blocks acceptance.
Terms
Capability : A named, versioned operation with typed input, output, scope, risk, timeout, retry, verification, and rollback semantics.
Provider : A server-side adapter that translates an authorized capability into bounded target operations. It does not decide authorization.
Plan : An immutable description of intended effects, preconditions, bindings, validity, verification, and rollback behavior.
Approval : Permission to apply one exact plan. It is neither transferable nor replayable.
Verification : Evaluation of declared postconditions, separate from execution success.
Evidence : Correlated, redacted records of request, decision, execution, and verification.
Yukh boundary
Yukh MCP governs operational capability. Yukh Projects owns durable delivery state. Yukh Coordination carries non-authoritative work signals. Neither project state nor coordination messages grant execution authority.